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9.1  Policy Phases and Adjustment Patterns 
Turkey was the first major developing country (LDC) debtor to face 
a payments crisis after 1973. Turkey’s debt debacle began in mid-1977, 
before the second oil shock of the late  1970s. Indeed, Turkey’s debt 
reschedulings prior to 1982 were the largest ever undertaken, and ac- 
counted for nearly 70 percent of the total volume of debt renegotiated 
by all LDCs in the 1978-80 period. Despite this massive restructuring 
of debt, Turkey experienced an agonizing foreign exchange crisis from 
1978 to 1980. In early  1980, in an unexpectedly bold fashion, Turkey 
launched an outward-oriented adjustment program which produced an 
export-led recovery and an acceptable degree of creditworthiness by 
1982-83, just as the LDC debt crisis started to dominate the headlines. 
Against the backdrop of such anomalous characteristics, Turkey has 
been informally referred to as “the Baker Plan country before the Baker 
Plan.” The Baker Plan (in October 1985) called for intensive, market- 
based micro-level domestic adjustments in return for expanded inter- 
national lending to the problem debtors. In recent years, the multilateral 
lending institutions have increasingly stressed trade and financial lib- 
eralization in their programs for LDCs with debt-servicing difficulties. 
Together with the well-known cases of the export-oriented East Asian 
economies, Turkey’s recent adjustment experience is often cited by 
the international  financial community as a successful reference case 
for the approach currently promoted  in  the management of the LDC 
crisis. 
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in Ankara, Turkey. Dani Rodrik is an assistant professor of  public policy at the John F. 
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In the design  of  adjustment programs for major debtors, a  set of 
common questions arise as to the appropriate timing and magnitude of 
external financing, the proper mix and sequencing of domestic policies, 
and the nature of social costs likely to be faced in the transition process. 
Our  forthcoming  monograph on  the Turkish experience (see the country 
studies volumes of this project), on which the present chapter draws, 
aims to provide a balanced account, intended for generalized assess- 
ments as well as for policy evaluations specific to Turkey. 
Our approach is essentially ex post and empirical, and we do not 
offer economic projections or explicit recommendations for future pol- 
icy actions. The underlying objective of the study is to contribute to 
an  improved  understanding  of  foreign  borrowing  and  of  policy- 
performance linkages in the Turkish economy in the face of the external 
disturbances of the post-1973 period. 
9.  I.  1  Background 
In its recent history, Turkey faced foreign exchange stringency at 
three junctures: in  1957-58,  1969-70,  and 1978-80.  Each episode in- 
volved  IMF-supported programs  involving  stabilization  with  deval- 
uation.  Domestic  political difficulties and unrest were heightened  at 
each instance, paving the way for military interventions in 1960, 1971, 
and 1980, mainly on grounds of restoring law and order. The payments 
difficulties were relatively mild in 1969-70,  as was the partial military 
intervention  in  1971, which  did  not  result  in  the dissolution  of  the 
existing Parliament. The military takeovers of 1960 and 1980 were more 
complete, however, resulting in the adoption of new constitutions (in 
1961  and  1982). At each stage, the military interventions were transi- 
tional and brief. They were terminated with multiparty parliamentary 
elections and the formation of civilian governments. 
With the institutionalization of formal planning in the early  1960s, 
Turkey  pursued its  development efforts in  the context of  five-year 
plans, which gradually lost their policy effectiveness in the post-I973 
period. During the initial two plans (1963-67  and 1968-72),  GNP growth 
averaged around 6.8 percent per year with relative price stability and 
moderate reliance on external assistance (amounting to about 1.5 per- 
cent of GNP per year). The planning techniques in this period made 
heavy use of a restrictive trade regime, state enterprise investments, 
and financial repression as key institutional tools in achieving the import- 
substituting industrialization objectives. 
9.1.2  The 1970s: Debt Crisis and Lack of Adjustment 
For the Turkish economy, the 1970s were the best of times and the 
worst of times. The decade witnessed  an unprecedented spurt of in- 
vestment and growth until about 1977, accompanied by what looked 195  Turkish Experience with Debt 
like a steady improvement in income distribution. This was followed 
by a crash that was equally unprecedented. From mid-1977 on, Turkey 
found itself in  a monumental debt crisis which took several years of 
intricate negotiations with creditors and a long series of rescheduling 
agreements to resolve. Growth suffered heavily, with two years of real 
contraction at the end of the decade; income distribution began to turn 
against urban workers and the peasantry. 
With hindsight, it is not too difficult to provide a broad interpretation 
of the Turkish experience prior to 1977. The early years of the decade 
had been a time of great optimism as the perennial external constraint 
appeared to have been permanently relaxed, thanks largely to a rapid 
rise in workers’ remittances. As table 9.1 shows, the current account 
was actually in surplus for two years in a row in 1972 and 1973. Partly 
as a consequence, the public sector went on an investment binge shortly 
thereafter, and encouraged the private  sector to follow suit.  As the 
share of  investment rose from  18.1 percent of GDP (in 1973) to 25.0 
percent (in 1977), the real growth rate of the economy reached its zenith 
at 8.9 percent (in 1975 and 1976). 
There were two problems, however. First, all of this was taking place 
in  the  context of  the fourfold  rise in  world  oil  prices.  Second, the 
government succumbed to all of the usual policy pitfalls: price distor- 
tions including overvalued exchange rates, large public sector deficits, 
and an accommodating monetary stance. These helped swing the cur- 
rent  account  sharply  into deficit,  moving it from  a surplus of  $534 
million in 1973 to a deficit of $3,43  1 million in  1977. The current deficits 
were financed by external borrowing, much of it short term. 
Table 9.1  Macroeconomic Performance of Turkey During the 1970s 
Current 
Account 
Real  GDP  Inflation Rate  Balance  Investment 
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As foreign lenders started getting jittery at the beginning of  1977, 
the stage was set for a debt crisis. New flows slowed down to a trickle, 
and  the Central Bank’s  depleted  reserves  forced it  into arrears on 
payments to foreign banks, governments, and export suppliers. The 
consequent foreign exchange shortages led to a forced reduction of the 
current account deficit by  administrative means, the collapse  of  in- 
vestment and growth, and an upsurge of inflation (see table 9.1). The 
next few years witnessed a series of debt renegotiations with creditors. 
What were the sources of this debt debacle? Conventional wisdom 
stresses the adverse external environment, misguided exchange rate 
and fiscal policies, and the short-term nature of the liabilities incurred 
during the 1973-77  period. But there must have been more at work. 
Until the debt crisis of  1982, Turkey’s debt problems were among the 
most severe experienced by  the postwar international system. Unlike 
practically all of the other newly industrializing countries experiencing 
debt difficulties, Turkey got into trouble after the first oil shock, rather 
than the second one. This suggests, prima facie, that the usual expla- 
nations of the crisis-in  terms of a combination of external shocks with 
a number of key inappropriate domestic policies such as overvalued 
exchange rates and a lax monetary and fiscal stance-at  best will go 
only part of the way in explaining its origins. In comparative perspec- 
tive, the external shocks experienced by Turkey were not particularly 
severe; nor were the Turkish macroeconomic policies excessively dis- 
torted. It is likely that these policies would have gotten Turkey into 
trouble eventually.  But we have to look for additional reasons why 
Turkey’s crisis occurred sooner rather than later. 
The precocious nature of Turkey’s debt crisis is best explained by 
reference to the borrowing “strategy” in place. Between 1975 and 1977 
Turkey relied on a form of foreign borrowing with intrinsically desta- 
bilizing features. To  attract capital inflows, the authorities depended 
disproportionately  on  the  so-called convertible  Turkish lira deposit 
(CTLD) scheme, whose key feature was that it protected  domestic 
borrowers from all exchange risk. This exchange guarantee acted as a 
subsidy on foreign borrowing by  the private sector, as the domestic 
currency was already perceived to be overvalued by the beginning of 
1975. More important, it  rendered the implicit subsidy an increasing 
function of the expected depreciation of the Turkish lira. 
The resulting  borrowing  was heavily biased  toward the  “strong” 
currencies (predominantly the deutsche-mark and the Swiss franc) with 
low nominal interest rates.  As borrowing increased and the current 
account deteriorated, there was increased anticipation of further de- 
preciation  of  the domestic currency. That in turn raised the implicit 
subsidy on foreign borrowing, giving rise to even greater incentives to 
borrow. Hence the CTLD scheme had the fatal flaw of engendering an 197  Turkish Experience with Debt 
ever-expanding spiral of  over-borrowing  by  the private  sector. Ac- 
cording to our calculations, the marginal cost of foreign funds (denom- 
inated in D-marks) was at least 20-25  percent towards the end of  1976, 
implying a real interest-rate burden of around 16-21  percent. Borrow- 
ing went on, since domestic borrowers paid only a fraction of this cost, 
with the rest effectively socialized under the exchange guarantee. 
Consequently, even though the counterpart to the current deficits of 
the period was, in  an accounting sense, an investment boom by the 
public sector (see table 9.2), it is hard to envisage that this could have 
justified foreign borrowing at such terms. The boom was sustainable 
only to the extent that foreign banks were  willing to increase their 
exposure to Turkey at an ever-increasing pace.  Once foreign banks 
slowed their lending, the edifice collapsed. 
The crisis  developing in  mid-1977 threw  Turkey into a period  of 
forced  adjustment.  As foreign exchange  sources dried  up, external 
balance for the first time in many years became a genuinely binding 
constraint, requiring an adjustment in the relationship between income 
and absorption in the economy. How was this adjustment achieved? 
Policy itself was of little help. The IMF was called on to administer a 
series of stabilization programs, and two sets of adjustment measures 
were announced, one in early  1978 and the other in  1979. But both 
Table 9.2  Investment-Saving Balance and Growth of  Real Expenditures, 
1973-77 
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programs, as  well as  the two corresponding  IMF standby arrangements, 
proved unsuccessful. Until January 1980, the various adjustment mea- 
sures undertaken by the authorities can be described as “too little, too 
late.”  The reduction in government spending was only half-hearted, 
and exchange rate policy, albeit more active, lagged behind rising in- 
flation. The policymakers  were too conscious of political support to 
administer radical shock treatment, and too divided to implement any 
feasible alternative. 
The burden of achieving the requisite adjustment fell on investment 
and inflation (see table 9.1). Between mid-1977 and early 1980, a col- 
lapse in investment and an inflationary spiral were the key mechanisms 
for ensuring that the external constraint was met. In the absence of 
sufficient reduction in nominal expenditures, and of real exchange rate 
depreciations, absorption could be brought in line with the available 
resources only by engineering inflation. It was inflation that equilibrated 
the open-economy income identity by closing the gap between ex ante 
demand and supply. 
9.1.3  The 1980s: Adjustment Policies and Stabilization 
In  conjunction  with  inner-oriented  expansionary macroeconomic 
policies, the largely unnoticed buildup of price distortions in 1973-77 
had produced not only a stagnation in exports, but also a rapid rise in 
the intensity of imports in production, resulting in a negative import- 
substitution as a source of growth at the aggregate level. Against the 
background  of import and output contraction, commodity  shortages 
and  hoarding,  and strained  relations  with  the international  financial 
community during 1978-79,  the newly installed minority government 
of  Suleyman Demirel  was  persuaded  to introduce a  comprehensive 
package of policy measures in January 1980. The policy package was 
unexpectedly bold in terms of its anti-inflationary measures as well as 
its qualitative aspects, which  gave clear signals of a greater export- 
and market-orientation in the development strategy. 
As shown in table 9.3, the macroeconomic and trade performance 
has been quite remarkable  since then, especially in a generally unfa- 
vorable world  economic environment. Following the contraction of 
output in the first year of the policy package, GNP growth has averaged 
around 4.6 percent per year (in 1981 -85),  accompanied by sharp rises 
in  trade ratios.  In value terms, merchandise  exports have increased 
from around $2.3 billion in  1979 to $8.3 billion in 1985 with the share 
of  manufactured  products going from 35 to 75 percent in  the same 
period. 
The reduction in the rate of inflation from about 105 percent in 1980 
to 28  percent in 1983 was a substantial one, even though inflationary 
pressures intensified in  1984-85.  After declining 20 percent  in  1977- Table 9.3  Macroeconomic Performance, 1980-86 
1980  1981  I982 
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(continued) Table 9.3  (continued) 
D.  Domestic Credits (%F 
by: Deposit money banks 
Investment banks 
Central bank 




E.  External Debt 
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bReal domestic final expenditures, excluding inventory changes. 
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dExcludes  workers’ remittances. 
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79, private fixed investment further dropped around 26 percent in real 
terms during 1980-  1982. Thus, the output increase came essentially 
from the existing productive  capacity, which responded to  the increased 
availability  of  the  imported inputs, and from expenditure-switching 
policies of the new program. 
A number of special factors have played an important role in Turkey's 
economic recovery since 1980. Among these, the most salient ones 
were (i) the transitional military rule from 1980 to 1983, which provided 
continuity and added political clout in the policy process; (ii) sizable 
debt relief and new lending; (iii) special market conditions in the Middle 
East affected  by  the Iran-Iraq conflict  in  the Persian  Gulf; and  (iv) 
substantial downward flexibility of real wages and agricultural prices, 
which made it possible to attain a new set of equilibrium prices and 
conditions  more  compatible  with  macroeconomic stability  and  in- 
creased trade-orientation in the economy. As shown in table 9.4, debt 
relief and new external credits were very sizable, obviating the need 
to generate surpluses in the noninterest current account in the earlier 
years of the program (unlike the situations faced by the Latin American 
debtors in the post-1982 period). An effective policy dialogue with the 
IMF (initially involving a three-year standby agreement of SDR 1,200 
million) and the World Bank (providing five SAL's totaling $1.6 billion 
in addition to regular project lending) facilitated debt relief agreements, 
concessional bilateral lending, and all-around creditor support during 
the 1980-85  period. 
Policy Sequence 
The adjustment program of the 1980s proceeded in discernible stages. 
The immediate policy objectives of the first stage (1980-81)  were to 
restore an acceptable degree of  macroeconomic stability,  to relieve 
shortages of essential commodities, and to induce an export-oriented 
recovery in output. Regaining public confidence by eliminating hoard- 
ing and parallel markets was perceived  as a prerequisite for the sub- 
sequent structural components of the program. 
The initial policy package of January 1980 contained a steep deval- 
uation  (exceeding IMF expectations), deregulation  of  private-sector 
industrial prices, and huge price hikes for the state economic enterprise 
(SEE) products and services (ranging from 45 percent for gasoline to 
300 percent for paper and 400 percent for fertilizer against the backdrop 
of 70 percent inflation). The package contained supplementary incen- 
tives for export promotion  and  simplified administrative  procedures 
for imports. The first significant but still partial change in the import 
regime  came in  January  1981  with  the elimination of the quota list 
(with all items not shown in the liberalized lists for imports remaining 
prohibited).  In  June  1980,  bank  interest  rates  were  substantially Table 9.4  Financing the Current Account, 1980-86  ($ million) 
1986  1980-85 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  (provisional)  ($ billion)  % 
Part A: After Debt Relief 
Interest payments 
Noninterest current account 
Current account balance 
Part B: Before Debt Relief 
Current account balance 
Nondebt financing 
Direct foreign investment 
Changes in reserves 
Counterpart to valuation changes 
Net foreign borrowing 
Long-term (LT) 
Debt relief (interest + principal) 
Other LT (net) 
IMF (net use) 
Implied  short-term 
Memo items 
Debt repayment (LT, after relief) 
Debt service (after relief) 
Net resource transfer 
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deregulated, resulting  in  sharp rises  in  rates for time  deposits and 
nonpreferential credit to borrowers. A firm signal for the maintenance 
of a realistic exchange rate policy was given initially through frequent 
mini-devaluations, and from May 1981 on by daily adjustments. By the 
end of 1981, an export-driven output recovery had begun, accompanied 
by a substantially depreciated currency and a sizable reduction in the 
rate of domestic inflation. 
The second stage of the program (in 1982-83)  strove to consolidate 
the conditions for macroeconomic stability, and to maintain the relative 
price realignment as of the end of  1981. During this stage of policy 
consolidation,  no major moves were made towards the further liber- 
alization of domestic and external markets. Institutional measures pro- 
duced some helpful results in areas such as external debt management, 
establishment of a new framework for the small and ineffective secu- 
rities market, and income tax changes aiming at supply-side responses. 
However, the tax reform resulted in the reduction of the tax/GNP ratio 
from  19 percent in  1981 to 17 percent in  1983 as it offset the bracket 
creep of the previous inflationary period. 
The financial liberalization  process initiated by the flexible interest 
rate policy  was  not  followed  up with  sufficient  care and expertise. 
Turkey faced a major crisis in mid-1982 with the collapse of brokerage 
firms that had  been  involved in  highly  risky credit transactions and 
corporate bond trading. The crisis led to the replacement  of the top 
economic team, a relaxed monetary stance, and a somewhat reduced 
official enthusiasm for outward orientation. 
The third stage (from November 1983 on), under the civilian gov- 
ernment of Turgut Ozal, featured a deeper liberalization of the current 
and capital accounts of the balance of payments. Although far from 
being a neutral trade regime, the new trade policy framework provides 
an unprecedented openness to the Turkish economy on merchandise 
trade and invisible transactions. A novel feature of  the import com- 
ponent of the new trade regime is the presence of a negative list, which 
explicitly indicates the prohibited import items. The pre-1984 import 
regimes had contained only positive lists (subject to varying degrees 
of liberalization), beyond which all  imported items were prohibited. 
Thus, the removal of the quantitative restrictions (QRs) was significant 
in the trade reform moves of early  1984. Tariffs and other levies on 
imports have also been reduced, but they have been subject to frequent 
revisions by the authorities. 
The post-1983  government introduced  additional  policy  changes, 
mainly in the area of fiscal management.  Further measures also have 
been  taken to strengthen  the bank supervision  system and to allow 
foreign commercial banks to enter Turkey’s financial market. Following 
the reactivation of syndicated borrowing from the international market 204  Merih CelasunlDani Rodrik 
in  1982, local commercial banks have been increasingly allowed by the 
authorities to utilize short-term credits and foreign exchange deposits 
in their trade-financing operations. The external debt stock has climbed 
from $18 billion in  1983 to $31  billion in  1986, reflecting in part the 
appreciation of the major European currencies against the U.S. dollar 
since early 1985. As a result, and with the termination of debt relief in 
1984, Turkey's debt servicing burden has increased substantially in the 
last few years (see section E in table 9.3) 
Interpreting the Post-1980 Adjustment 
How do we interpret the relatively successful adjustment of the Turk- 
ish economy in the post-1980 period? It seems clear that the radical 
changes in the structure of relative prices, and the attendant shifts in 
patterns of income distribution, were the key internal mechanism for 
reducing inflation and initiating export-led recovery. Figure 9.1 displays 
the drastic transformation  in  the relative  price  structure after  1978. 
While the prereform period (1978-79)  had already set some of  these 
changes in motion, particularly  the decline in real wages and in agri- 
culture's  terms of  trade, the policies of  the  1980s consolidated and 
accentuated  them.  The net  effect  was  a substantial increase in  the 
profitability of the traded manufactures sector, and a sharp reduction 
in labor and farmers'  incomes. On  the whole, these also implied an 
improvement in  the terms of trade of  the public sector vis-a-vis the 
private  sector, which proved  to be the key to the reduction  of  real 
private  expenditures.  Hence, these relative  price  changes  not  only 
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resulted in expenditure switching, in the conventional manner, but were 
also instrumental in reducing absorption. 
In combination with wage repression and lower support prices for 
agriculture, these relative price changes have been engineered mainly 
by SEE price increases, exchange rate depreciation, and switching to 
positive rates on bank deposits. The restructured price system sharply 
favored the public sector, increased the share of SEES in public savings, 
and lowered the dependence on Central Bank financing. In turn, the 
share of private disposable income in GNP declined at constant prices. 
Besides promoting expenditure-switching towards exports, the relative 
price and income shifts thus contributed to reductions in current ab- 
sorption and  public  sector deficits,  particularly  during the  1980-82 
period. In the absence of a significant additional tax effort, the burden 
of  adjustment in the public sector fell mainly on subsidies, employee 
salaries, and current social expenditures as the government strove to 
sustain  public  employment  and  fixed  investments  in  infrastructure 
sectors. 
With the adoption of the policy of positive real rates on time deposits, 
the income velocity of broad money (M2) was gradually lowered from 
5.0 in  1980 to 3.4 in 1985. Besides favorably affecting the expansion of 
financial intermediation in the economy, the positive deposit rates have 
served to increase the availability of  bank credit to finance working 
capital, albeit at sharply increased bank-loan risks and real user costs. 
In the presence of reduced but still large public sector deficits, the high 
interest rates have contributed to private net savings mainly through 
lower private business investment rather than through higher savings 
rates in the private sector. 
That these sharp changes in  relative prices could be maintained is 
in  no small measure due to the special political circumstances of the 
period. The military regime of  1980-83 was in the comparatively rare 
position of enjoying broad popular support as it restored law and order, 
which had been severely lacking before September 1980. In addition, 
debt relief and capital inflows reduced the magnitude of the requisite 
fiscal retrenchment. 
9.2  Aspects of Debt and Adjustment 
9.2.1  External Borrowing, Wage Flexibility, and Trade-Liberalizing 
Devaluations: A General Equilibrium Analysis (1978-83) 
A comparative study of the Turkish adjustment efforts in  1978-79 
and  1980-83  brings out the important roles of the trade adjustment 
mechanism  and of  the  macroeconomic  context  in  a  semi-industrial 
country facing disturbances from the external environment. The 1978- 206  Merih CelasunlDani Rodrik 
79 episode reveals that import compression by means of  quantity ra- 
tioning  (serving as  the  trade  adjustment  mechanism) has  a  limited 
effectiveness in maintaining a modicum of growth in a heavily import- 
dependent and structurally rigid economy, especially under lax demand 
management. 
In turn, the post-1980 experience shows the feasibility of resuming 
outward-oriented expansion under a gradually liberalized trade regime 
supported by timely external assistance, an improved macroeconomic 
setting, and adequate shifts in relative prices and incomes. The Turkish 
case also suggests, however, that the required changes in relative prices 
and income distribution may be quite pronounced in an economy char- 
acterized by structural rigidities and distortions. In the context of such 
policy concerns and research issues, our longer monograph summarizes 
the findings of a general equilibrium analysis with a computable mul- 
tisectoral model calibrated to observed 1978-83 data. 
Our counterfactual simulations explore the economy-wide effects of 
trade-liberalizing devaluations (which aim at reduced levels of quantity 
rationing of nonoil imports) under varying sets of urban wage policies 
and predetermined limits on external borrowing. The simulations dem- 
onstrate and quantify the high marginal productivity of  external bor- 
rowing and the growth-supporting role of the downward flexibility of 
real wages under the economic conditions of Turkey prevailing in the 
early 1980s. 
9.2.2  Trade Regime and Export Performance 
It is possible to recast the Turkish experience with external debt in 
terms of a narrative exclusively involving trade flows. In such a case, 
the rapid accumulation of debt in 1973-77  would be seen as the con- 
sequence of rising imports with stagnant exports. In 1978-79, the econ- 
omy could be seen as in a tailspin with imports collapsing. The recovery 
after  1980 would be the result of a phenomenal increase in  exports, 
which allowed a revival in imports. To be sure, such a perspective is 
seriously misleading, since it focuses on trade alone. The accumulation 
of external debt and its servicing are both clearly macroeconomic phe- 
nomena.  These two are fundamentally linked to the relationship be- 
tween aggregate expenditures and national income. As such, the various 
microeconomic measures comprising a country’s trade regime play a 
somewhat secondary role.  Nonetheless, Turkey’s case demonstrates 
that the kind of import dependence and structural rigidity fostered by 
import-substitution policies  render  adjustment  to a  payments  crisis 
much more painful. The extent to which an economy is export oriented 
makes a big difference to the ease with which a given stock of foreign 
debt can be serviced, and is therefore an important indicator of  cre- 
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In view of the rather miraculous export performance since 1980, it 
is important to gauge the relative contributions of the various factors 
at work. A rough statistical decomposition of the increase in the volume 
of exports between  1979 and 1984 yields some interesting results. The 
bulk of the increase turns out to be accounted for by a dummy variable 
for 1981:11, which alone  “explains”  58 percent of  the difference be- 
tween the actual and counterfactual levels of exports in 1984. The real 
exchange rate  depreciations since 1979 “explain”  30 percent of the 
increase in  exports, and the reduction in exchange rate volatility an- 
other 7 percent, bringing the total contribution of exchange rate policy 
to 37 percent. The slowdown in industrial countries, on the other hand, 
has made a negative contribution of  12 percent. 
It is rather surprising that exchange rate policy has played such a 
moderate role in  view of  the vast real depreciations achieved  since 
1980. Also, the predominant  role of  the dummy variable points to a 
significant upwards shift in export supply or export demand (or both) 
during 1981. It is tempting to ascribe this effect to the Iran-Iraq war, 
as a boom in exports to these two countries started during  1981. In 
addition, a non-negligible share of the increase in exports after  1980 
turns out to have been the result of a statistical fiction: To take advan- 
tage of generous export subsidies, domestic entrepreneurs appear to 
have changed  their invoicing practices from  mild  underinvoicing  to 
substantial overinvoicing (at an average rate of  13 percent during 1981- 
85  in  exports to the OECD). Finally, the depressed  state of private 
investment throughout the first half of the 1980s suggests that very little 
export-oriented structural change has taken place in fact, with the bulk 
of exports coming from increased capacity utilization. 
9.2.3  Public-Sector Financial Management 
In comparative perspective, two aspects of Turkish fiscal policy stand 
out. First, as argued above, large fiscal deficits were not the ultimate 
cause of the debt crisis of  1977. In an accounting sense, of course, the 
growing current account deficits had their counterpart in a deteriorating 
fiscal balance. Whatever danger that may have implied over the longer 
run, the timing of the crisis was determined instead by the dynamics 
of debt itself. Under the convertible lira scheme, the capital account 
was set on an unsustainable course of ever-increasing foreign borrow- 
ing. Hence, the Turkish case may represent one instance where it may 
make  sense to reverse the usual causality,  and to ascribe the fiscal 
deficits to increasing debt rather than the reverse. The public sector 
acted as a vacuum; foreign inflows kept coming in. 
The second important aspect is that fiscal policy has played only a 
moderate role in the adjustment process of the 1980s. While the reform 
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enhance public savings, foreign official assistance in the early years of 
the recovery obviated the need for a dramatic retrenchment. Indeed, 
the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) stood at 10  percent 
in the first year of the adjustment program (1980), not too far from its 
level at the height of the crisis in  1977 (see figure 9.2). Since 1980, the 
public sector borrowing requirement has averaged around 5 percent of 
GNP, a large number in new of the growing debt-servicing burden and 
the consequent need to maintain the current account deficits at rea- 
sonable levels. 
The continuing burden of fiscal deficits has produced two crucial 
dilemmas. First, it has increased the cost of maintaining external com- 
petitiveness, as real exchange rate depreciations tend to increase the 
debt-servicing burden on the budget.  Second, it has forced the gov- 
ernment to rely increasingly on short-term domestic borrowing at real 
interest rates far exceeding the rate of growth of the economy, raising 
severe questions about longer-term stability. 
9.2.4  External Financial Relations and Debt Management 
Turkey’s important  geopolitical role  in  the Middle East and as a 
NATO member bordering on the Soviet Union was critical after 1979 
in mobilizing Western support-in  terms of  both debt relief and new 
flows-of a magnitude not  experienced in  any other recent case. A 
widespread feeling around official circles, as expressed in a New York 
Times editorial on 3 January 1979, was that “[tlhe strategic importance 
of  Turkey . . . is too great for Ankara’s fate to be left to the [Inter- 
national] Monetary Fund and commercial banks abroad.” Official lend- 
ers’ enthusiasm has also affected the policies of the IMF and the World 
Bank which showered Turkey with generous amounts of program lend- 
ing. During the first four years after the crisis of  1977 (1978-81), ex- 
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ternal flows allowed the Turkish economy to run an average current 
account deficit of  3.4  percent (of GNP), and an average noninterest 
current account deficit of 2.3 percent. In fact, net resource transfers 
to Turkey turned negative for the first time only in 1982, a comfortable 
five years  after the original crisis. The contrast with  the post-1982 
experience of other heavily-indebted countries could not be starker. 
The absence of  an intense squeeze on the current account, as was 
the case in most other countries, has greatly facilitated the implemen- 
tation  of  the  reforms  after  1980, as well  as setting the  stage for a 
recovery. It is largely because of  capital inflows that the Turkish sta- 
bilization took place  alongside  an economic expansion.  In  this  key 
respect, Turkey’s adjustment experience provides an obvious lesson 
for the current strategy in the global debt crisis. 
Since 1982, Turkey’s reliance on official inflows has diminished. Such 
inflows have been replaced by syndicated loans, and, to a much greater 
extent, by renewed short-term borrowing on the part of domestic banks 
and the Central Bank. The borrowing experience of the last few years 
has brought  to the fore the  recurring  penchant  of  policymakers  for 
rather exotic borrowing arrangements with relatively short-term ma- 
turities and high premia over international  rates (e.g., the CTLDs in 
the 1970s, the Dresdner Bank scheme in  the 1980s). These have not 
served Turkey well  in  the past, and there are some questions as to 
whether they will do so in the future. 
9.3  Conclusions and Prospects 
Turkey has managed to transform itself from the problem country of 
the 1970s to the model debtor of  the  1980s. Our account stresses the 
role both of the domestic policy changes and of the external environ- 
ment in this accomplishment. While a remarkable amount of adjustment 
has  clearly  taken  place,  some problem  areas continue to cloud  the 
horizon. 
First, the problems of  fiscal adjustment are, if  anything, likely to 
become  accentuated  in  an era of  growing debt-service burden.  The 
fiscal retrenchment  that  has  taken  place  since  1980 has not been a 
remarkable one, and the public-sector  budget  remains  the Achilles’ 
heel of the Turkish macroeconomy. Second, the Turkish economy still 
lacks a well-founded “debt  strategy.”  Ever since the mid-1970s, the 
debt  accumulation  process  has  been  marked  by  recourse  to rather 
exotic arrangements whose long-term stability is problematic.  Third, 
the extent to which the real economy and growth process have adjusted 
to the changes in the structure of relative prices since 1980 is unclear. 
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private investment  in tradables. Finally, the Turkish economy continues 
to be plagued by the consequences for income distribution of  the debt 
crisis of  the late  1970s. Any attempt to reverse these consequences 
will likely  put strains on macro balances  that are already  somewhat 
shaky. Appendix 
Table 9.5  External Debt, 1978-86 
(mill. US $)  1978  I979  I980  1981  I982  1983  1984  1985  I986 
Total external debt 
Medium and long-term debt 
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25,012  31,228 
18,395  21,837 
6,103  6,588 
8,013  10,187 
6,776  8,270 
4,014  4,833 
265  229 
6,617  9,391 
3,755  5,406 
2,678  3,788 
432  944 
376  77 
2,862  3,985 
18  6 
1,093  1,061 
609  629 
724  1,250 
Source: Central Bank. 
"The subcategory or subcategories shown represent only a partial list of this kind of debt, with the exception of  the years 1978-83  in the 
private sector in which the list of subcategories is complete. 
hIncludes rescheduled convertible Turkish lira deposits (CTLDs) from 1979 on. 
CThese  include deposits with maturity longer than one year. 
dNonresc  heduled CTLDs. 